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Abstract 
The paper tries to assess the roles that political parties play in the political system of Czech 
parliamentary democracy. Popular evaluation of the parties’ performance seen by the eyes of 
the Czech public is rather skeptical. Parties are seen as weak and corrupted vehicles of 
political power without transmitting important societal interests and embodying important 
political and moral values. We are going to present different point of view. The analysis of 
Czech political parties will be based on a catalogue of parties’ systemic functions and 
evaluation of the scope and quality of Czech political parties in respect to them.  
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In the European Union (EU) today political parties face a range of issues and 
challenges within the party systems of their respective countries. For parties in  new member 
states of the EU, those which underwent a process of democratic transition during the 1990s, 
the situation is more complicated than for the rest. In a way, their position is more precarious 
than that of their Western European counterparts, as the concept of “political party” has 
various and not always positive connotations in Central Europe. Our contribution will not 
attempt to evaluate the positives and negatives of party politics in all EU member states with 
post-communist legacies, but will focus on the Czech Republic. Indeed, it was in the Czech 
Republic, following the fall of the communist regime, that the first democratic election (in 
Summer 1990) was won by the Civic Forum with its slogan “Parties are for partisans, Civic 
Forum is for everybody.” This slogan had an obvious tactical importance as part of the wider 
struggle with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and other parties of the former 
National Front. But it also had a symbolic dimension and resonated with certain contemporary 
discussions about democratic theory which suggested that political parties had outlived their 
purpose. The assumption at the time that broad, non-ideological political movements with 
loose structures such as the forums could replace traditional political parties was not 
ultimately borne out in reality (see Juchler, 1994: 126; Kitschelt, 2006); however, criticism of 
political parties in Czech political discourse is no weaker at the beginning of the 2010s than it 
was twenty years ago. On the contrary, it is acquiring a new dimension, as we shall see below.  
We believe that the Czech example is especially suitable for evaluating the role of 
parties in contemporary European democracies. On the one hand, the Czech political tradition 
has been affected by the experience of the communist regime; on the other, Czech party 
politics is in many respects closer to Western European patterns than is the Central European 
average. Above all, the nuclei of Czech party political traditions reach back to the 
revolutionary years 1848/1849 and party life continued developing between 1861 and 1938, a 
period which corresponds to the rise of mass parties in the West. Contemporary Czech party 
                                                 
1 Vlastimil Havlík worked on this paper in the framework of the grant project Contemporary Challenges of 
Democracy in East-Central Europe (GAP408/11/0709) sponsored by the Czech Science Foundation, Vít 
Hloušek in the framework of the grant project Party Systems in the Countries of Eastern Central Europe 
(P408/10/0295) sponsored by the Czech Science Foundation. 
2 Vít Hloušek works as an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, 
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University. E – mail: hlousek@fss.muni.cz. Vlastimil Havlík works as an 
assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University. E-mail: 
havlik@fss.muni.cz. 
 2 
politics thus features a certain institutional memory of the era when the political parties 
represented the crucial levers in the political process, in the years preceding World War I. and 
especially in the inter-war era of the First Czechoslovak Republic. At the same time, 
contemporary Czech political parties are sensitive towards the thorny issues which have 
accompanied the renewal and development of party pluralism following the era of socialist 
rule.  
Our contribution seeks to appraise the role played by contemporary Czech political 
parties in the country’s political system. As we do not seek to enrich the discussion which 
endeavours to provide a normative definition of the role of political parties in contemporary 
liberal democracies both in Europe and world-wide, we understand the concept of 
“democracy” in a comparatively narrow and instrumental sense as a method of organising the 
political process and of granting legitimacy to the political elite. We thus understand 
democracy as a process rather than a substance and the following definition will do for our 
purpose: 
 
“A democracy, briefly defined, is a political system in which citizens enjoy a number of basic 
civil and political rights, and in which their important political leaders are elected in free and 
fair elections and accountable under a rule of law.“ (Almond et al., 2001: 34). 
 
A consequence of understanding democracy as a process is that our interest will not be in the 
issue of moral values conveyed (or not) by the political parties, but rather in the functions the 
political parties ought to fulfil within the modern liberal political systems of representative 
democracy. The structure of our article follows this logic. First we will define these 
fundamental functions. We will then examine the image of the Czech political parties as seen 
by the Czech general public on the one hand and by the scholarly discussion within the 
political science on the other. Adopting a functional approach to political parties we will then 
analyse whether the Czech political parties fulfil their functions and whether they are any 
good at doing so. We will focus mostly on the present situation, roughly from 2005 onwards, 
but where we believe it is expedient or necessary, we shall digress back to the 2000s and 
1990s.  
 
 
Functions of political parties  
 
Scholars of politics were interested in identifying the functions fulfilled by political 
parties in modern representative democracies as early as the period preceding the turn of the 
1950s and the 1960s, when the systemic approach and the structural-functional analysis 
drawing on it, inspired above all by Gabriel Almond, had become dominant within political 
science. In his original version Almond had created a kind of catalogue of functions within 
the political process conceived as conversion of inputs to outputs: (1) interest articulation, (2) 
interest aggregation, (3) rule making, (4) rule application, (5) rule adjudication and (6) 
permanent political communication (Almond, Powell, 1966: 29; for a more recent version see 
for instance Almond et al., 2001: 46-50). According to Almond other functions need to be 
fulfilled in order for the system to remain operational, namely political socialization and 
political recruitment (selection of political representation and people active in politics). There 
can be no doubt that we enter here the territory of political parties which to some degree 
participate in all of the functions bound within the structures of a political system, as listed 
above.  
Attention to political parties and their functions or roles had already been given in the 
tradition of the government studies, especially in the twentieth century (see for example Fiala, 
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Strmiska, 1998: 62-63). Catalogues of political party functions appeared, some concise, others 
reaching dozens of entries. Some catalogues were grounded in describing the actual 
democratic practice, others tended to treat parties normatively, i.e. listing functions parties 
ought to fulfil. In this rather wide field we need to find a conception of political parties’ 
functions that would be synoptic and would interconnect, as necessary, the concept of 
political party function with a conception of political system which itself needs to fulfil 
certain functions.  
Although Klaus von Beyme’s attempt at this from the early 1980s is now almost thirty 
years old, we believe it fit for the purpose. Von Beyme identified four fundamental functions 
of the political parties (von Beyme, 1985: 13): 
1) the identification of goals (ideology and the programme), 
2) the articulation and aggregation of social interests, 
3) the mobilisation and socialisation of the general public within the system, 
particularly at elections 
4) elite recruitment and government formation. 
 
At the time when Beyme devised his analysis of the fundamental functions of political 
parties,
3
 party theory was still at the stage when catch-all parties had replaced mass parties. 
During the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s, the organizational pattern of many 
Western European parties and their functioning have undergone a transformation which was 
designated by later theory as emergence of the cartel party (Katz, Mair, 1995). It is obviously 
unnecessary to repeat here the basic definition of the cartel party or to reproduce the 
discussion about this concept’s heuristic capacity and empirical relevance. But we must bear 
in mind that the emergence of the cartel parties was the result of desegmentation of political 
behaviour, of increasing dependence of parties on state funding, and of centralised conducting 
of election campaigns through the media, primarily the TV. The parties’ response consisted in 
a more centralist organisation, professionalisation of political communication and decreasing 
importance of mass membership. As Klaus Detterbeck (2005) shows, empirical observations 
have supported the core notion of the cartel party concept, but they have also shown that 
elements of party organisation dating to the era of catch-all and even of mass parties retain 
their importance. For instance, state funding supplements and enlarges, sometimes 
substantially, the traditional resources provided by affiliated pressure groups. The concept of 
cartel party is clearly unable to explain all of the characteristics of the Czech political parties, 
which feature elements of catch-all parties and sometimes even of mass parties. It is 
nevertheless appropriate to ask the following question: How do the functions of political 
parties as defined by von Beyme apply in the era of cartel parties?  
The first function concerns party ideologies and programmes. Political parties must be 
able to offer to the electorate a coherent political programme that would, if they were to 
participate in the government, be the basis for that government’s programme. Party 
programmes provide a fundamental plan of political agenda which in the ideal case is 
grounded in the long-term ideological view of the world which the party espouses. The 
programme plays an important role for the opposition parties as well, helping to define the 
priorities of government critique and offering to the voters an alternative that might 
materialise after the next election. Some of the cartel party’s characteristics make one assume 
that mainstream parties are more pragmatic, yet this pragmatism might only appear in 
government documents and not necessarily already in party programmes. 
The second function links politics with the economy and the civic society. These three 
spheres in which activities are undertaken in the modern democratic state produce individual 
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interests which are then integrated through the intermediary system and the pressure groups 
present in this system. Only political parties are able to aggregate fragmented political 
interests on such a level of abstraction that they can become the basis for political decision 
making. The problem political parties face is the expansion of articulated interests. As Russell 
Dalton (2007) has shown, developed democracies are characterised by a rapid increase of a 
range of social interests as well as of new types of actors articulating these interests. This 
translates into increased demands on the political system. Political system and political 
process become more complex, concurrently with citizens’ increased perception that their 
particular interests are not sufficiently recognised by the system. The ability of parties to 
aggregate interests, and voter satisfaction with their performance, decrease in parallel, which 
leads us to the next function. 
In the “golden age” of mass parties (which are sometimes called parties of social 
integration) mobilisation and socialisation of citizens into the political system was an 
important component of party activities. These parties, which we could with a slight 
simplification consider the products of traditional cleavages (see  Lipset, Rokkan, 1967), were 
firmly anchored in the milieu of their voters. Through instruments which included party-
political newspapers, mass membership and networks of supporting organisations which 
socialised voters into the party environment, parties were able to create in certain countries 
(Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland) a culture of pillars with strong links between voters 
and parties (see Lijphart, 1977: 41-44).
4
 In such an environment it was easy for the parties not 
only to mobilise, but also to socialise their electorates. The shift towards catch-all parties and 
subsequently to cartel parties (Katz, Mair, 1995), the disintegration of traditional social and 
political milieux, and the fragmentation of society, has brought a profound individualisation 
to the processes of political socialisation. The behaviour of voters is less group-conditioned 
and the new forms of political communication and marketing put the political parties’ ability 
to mobilise electorates to a fundamental test (see Luther, Müller-Rommel, 2005: 7–10). 
Additionally, the position of political parties in East-Central Europe is impeded by the 
attitude of the general public which is mistrustful of them due to the several decades’ worth of 
experience with the non-democratic regime presided over by the communist party-state. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, the experience of the communist regime therefore intensifies the 
increasing dissatisfaction with politics (Politikverdrossenheit) and thus also with political 
parties as the key players in the political process, which has been observed in Western Europe 
in the last decade. Czech political parties too have to counter decreased interest in 
membership and in participation generally. The mobilisation and socialisation function is 
manifest in the ability of parties to induce the electorate’s participation in the political process 
(typically by showing up to vote and voting for a particular political party), but also in their 
ability to socialise the voters, or citizens generally (for instance by inducing them to become 
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examining political parties of post-communist Europe in the first half of the 1990s, Herbert Kitschelt defined 
three types of parties. Charismatic parties are elected because of their leaders. Programmatic parties because the 
voters support their programmes and expect their political preferences to be fulfilled in this manner. Clientelist 
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which experienced patrimonial communism with its dense hierarchic network of patrons and clients. 
Contrariwise, (direct) clientelism is weak in countries with tradition of bureaucratic-authoritarian communism 
(Hale 2007). The nature of Czech communism places the country in this last category of weak clientelism.  
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members, but also interesting them to participate broadly in their activities). From our point of 
view two indicators will be interesting to observe: voter turnout, which indicates the parties’ 
ability to mobilise the electorate, and data on party membership.  
Elite recruitment and government formation, von Beyme’s last function of political 
parties, has been strengthening historically, inasmuch as one of the strategies employed by 
contemporary parties is securing their access to state funding streams and political support; 
concomitant with this is the focus of these parties on securing control of the political offices. 
In the Czech parliamentary regime the crucial country-wide institutions are the bicameral 
parliament consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and the government which 
is accountable to the Chamber of Deputies.  
In determining the personnel of both of the chambers of the Parliament the electoral 
system plays an important role. It therefore impinges on the political parties as elite 
producers, predetermining to a certain degree the process of recruiting their cadres. The 
presence of independent representatives in the Czech parliament is interesting in this context. 
Whereas the election of the Chamber of Deputies employs a list proportional system (for 
specifics see Šedo et al., 2009) which does not allow the candidates to stand independently of 
parties’ candidate lists, the election of the Senate by a two-round system allows independent 
candidates to stand.  
In a parliamentary regime, the body which articulates and executes state policies is the 
government. This is one of the reasons why K. von Beyme (1985: 311-359) devotes so much 
space to explaining the processes of cadres recruitment. Von Beyme analyses several aspects 
of government and governance, ranging from the party-political composition of the cabinets, 
through their stability, the length of time the individual parties remain in government, to the 
impact parties have on government policies. These indicators allow one to establish which 
parties are critical for the formation of government and which, on the contrary, have only a 
limited or no influence on the shape of the executive (and why). Moreover, government 
stability is one of the most important considerations, influencing the quality of democracy and 
facilitating effective execution of the government policies.  
 
 
 
The image of party politics in Czech Republic 
 
There is no doubt that political parties represent the key actors in the political process, 
despite the growing influence of other actors and increasing importance of the international 
environment (i.e. the role played by the EU). Their position in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, a region influenced by the legacy of communism, is nevertheless different 
from that enjoyed by their Western European counterparts. In the Czech circumstances, but 
also elsewhere, the concept of party was equated with the all-powerful Communist Party. We 
have already mentioned how effectively this experience was incorporated by the Civic Forum 
into its electoral campaign in 1990. The dispute over the role of political parties has remained 
salient in Czech politics to this day, however. Two episodes must be mentioned here. The first 
incident whose roots predate the year 1990 had substantial repercussions for the Civic 
Forum’s development, in whose definitive disappearance in spring 1991 the controversy over 
its organisation was instrumental. From the very beginning, two antithetical views of the 
organisation’s future could be identified in the Forum. The first, connected with among others 
the first post-communist Czechoslovak president Václav Havel, was critical of traditional 
party organisation and preferred a looser structure for political movements. The other, which 
eventually prevailed in the Forum and founded the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), was led by 
Václav Klaus and favoured traditional party structures. This controversy was not solely about 
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party organisation, but equally about the role of traditional political parties and the nature of 
the political conflict in the society. Whereas Havel and politicians close to him viewed 
ideological conflicts and party politics in general critically, emphasising the role of civic 
society, the faction which eventually won in the Civic Forum understood party politics as 
paramount for the political structuring of the society and thought the various civic activities as 
more or less transient (Havelka, 1998, Novák, 1997: 34-36, Pšeja, 2005: 46-59).  
The second episode which to a certain degree followed the “initiating” conflict within 
the Civic Forum was connected with the so-called Opposition Agreement, i.e. the support by 
ODS for a minority social democratic government. The Opposition Agreement, which 
included among other things proposals for extensive changes in the constitutional and 
political system, but even more so the actors which signed the Agreement, became symbols of 
“evil” partisanship, and targets of criticisms voiced not only by other political parties but also 
by numerous civic initiatives (Dřevíč appeal [Dřevíčská výzva], Impuls 99 and Thank you, 
now leave [Děkujeme, odejděte]). Both Czech and foreign political scientists and 
commentators entered the discussion about the political arrangements at the time, providing 
substantially different interpretations. On the one hand, one could point to authors (Fiala, 
Mikš 2006) who understood the Opposition Agreement as a corollary of previous political 
development. On the other, we would find authors (Klíma, 2002) who understood the 
Opposition Agreement as a grand coalition de facto and considered it to pose a threat to 
Czech democracy. Although neither of these two interpretations could be described as 
dominant at the time, the very controversy surrounding the Opposition Agreement and the 
discussions that followed had consequences for the general perception of political parties. In 
the long term, trust in politics and political parties in the Czech republic is comparatively low 
and, most importantly, gradually decreasing (see Linek, 2010). The growing dissatisfaction 
with party political performance must also be put in the contexts of the fairly high instability 
of the Czech governments (Havlík, 2011, Kopeček, Havlík, 2008) and of the debates about 
the allegedly increasing links between political parties and private economic interests. The 
criticism of parties which have long-term relevance in the Czech political system, and also of 
their leaders, reached a peak in the 2010 election of the Chamber of Deputies, when 
incumbent parties lost 33.6 per cent in comparison with the previous election, and 114 (!) out 
of the 200 deputies were newcomers (Haughton et al., 2011, Kneblová, 2010). 
Many political scientists are likewise critical of the Czech political parties. Elizabeth 
Bakke (2010: 65-67) for instance points out that the civic society institutions are generally 
fairly weak; she also notes the related fact that parties were built in a top-down 
fashion; political party membership in countries which experienced “really existing 
socialism” is low. Geoffrey Pridham (2009: 281-282) emphasises the already-mentioned low 
level of trust by the public in political parties. Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton 
(2010: 237) brought attention to a related issue, viz. the Czech public’s perception that their 
political representation as a whole displays an affinity for corrupt behaviour. Kopecký (2006: 
125-128) points out that the Czech political parties essentially seized control of the process of 
recruiting political and administrative personnel, and particularly criticises the fact that 
administrative positions are routinely newly occupied with the change in the governing 
coalition, which hurts the professionalism of the civil service. Kopecký also highlighted the 
parties’ tendency to push civic society bodies out of the public discourse, notwithstanding the 
fact that their own ability to generate political participation and to articulate interests is weak 
indeed.  
The facts listed testify to the ongoing negative perception of the Czech political 
parties. One of the reasons for this can be the parties’ inability to fulfil their function. 
Employing the functional approach, let us now look more closely whether such criticism is 
justified.  
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Identification of goals 
 
That function of political parties which demands that they identify their goals is 
manifest practically in party programmes. Günter Olzog and Hans-J. Liese (1991: 12-14) 
identify long-term fundamental programmes, which set strategic goals for the parties, as well 
as their fundamental ideological position, action programmes on actual political topics, 
electoral programmes, conceived for elections, parliamentary or otherwise, and finally 
government policy statements, where the party programmes materialise transformed by virtue 
of government responsibility. In the Czech political reality action programmes consist mainly 
in individual conceptual materials usually prepared mid-term by the opposition parties which 
thereby seek to respond to the government agenda and elaborate an alternative political 
vision. 
How do the ideological foundations and programmes of Czech political parties look? 
The comparatively swift consolidation of the Czech party system, in terms of both  
establishment and demarcation of the main relevant parties which already took place in the 
mid-1990s (see Dančák, Hloušek, 2007: 200-201) and consolidation of the socio-economic 
cleavage as the dominant one (see Hloušek, Kopeček, 2009: 526-533; Chytilek, Eibl 2011), 
allowed for a relatively quick stabilisation of the main ideological-political options. The space 
on the left has been divided between the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the latter exhibiting anti-systemic 
tendencies. Up to 1998, the space of the right was contested by the popular ODS and the 
small Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). Between 1998 and 2006, Freedom Union (US) 
occupied ODA’s position, and following a brief intermezzo of ODS dominance without a 
direct contestant, Tradition, Responsibility, and Prosperity (TOP09) became ODS’ challenger 
on the right. Although the Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People’s Party 
(KDU-ČSL) does not enjoy parliamentary representation at this time, it is a party with a 
traditional standing in the political centre and up to the 2010 parliamentary election had  
substantial coalition potential. The populist formation Public Affairs (VV) is the only one 
eluding an unequivocal classification on the right–left axis, socio-economically defined. 
Similarly, VV cannot be classified into any of the traditional party families, whereas the other 
relevant Czech parties display a pronounced affinity with Western European members of the 
respective party families (see Hloušek, Kopeček, 2010: 231-239). This affinity becomes even 
more remarkable when put in the context of other Central European countries.
5
 In the analysis 
that follows we will be primarily dealing with the parties currently with parliamentary 
representation and, where heuristically appropriate, also with KDU-ČSL and the Green Party 
(SZ).  
Not all of the parties listed have a long-term fundamental programme. KSČM is an 
example of a party which does have one, as the party produces extensive fundamental, 
medium-term and election programmes. A long-term programme was approved by the party 
                                                 
5
  VV also defies the Czech standards in that it does not exhibit features that traditional party 
organisations have. It could probably be described as a business firm party (Hopkin – Paolucci 1999). The 
designation implies that the party is organised and run as business whose aim is to be successful in elections, 
subordinating its profile and strategy to this goal. It does not rely on the traditional resources of membership, 
stable aggregation of interests and long-term policy priorities. The connection of VV with the ABL security 
agency is indeed one of the causes of the party’s current crisis. The development of VV hitherto supports 
Jonathan Hopkin’s and Catherine Paolucci’s (1999: 335) assumption that a business firm party „(...) undermines 
stable party competition, creating the potential for party system „turbulence‟, and fails to provide voters with a 
political identity.“ 
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already in October 1990. In December 1992 the so-called Kladno programme was adopted 
and became the party’s fundamental document. It was supplemented and updated not only 
with the individual electoral programmes, but also with more substantial medium-term 
manifestos adopted at KSČM’s party congresses. The fact that the Kladno programme 
remains the party’s fundamental manifesto testifies to the party’s programmatic continuity 
(Fiala et al., 2005: 1415-1418).  
Medium-term programmes are more common in the Czech Republic and have been 
adopted repeatedly by ČSSD, ODS and KDU-ČSL. ODS last adopted a medium-term 
programme in February 2010: the document called “Vision 2020” [Vize 2020] articulates 
general goals and priorities for ODS’ policies, exceeding one electoral term.6 ČSSD’s 
programme is even more developed: in addition to the document named “Open to new 
challenges” [Otevřenost novým výzvám], which was adopted in 2003 and, given its contents 
and conception, could be considered a long-term programme, the party also has a medium-
term programme and a wide range of further documents setting its position, of which the so-
called Orange books [Oranžové knihy] expressing the political standpoints of ČSSD’s shadow 
cabinet members deserve special attention.
7
  
KDU-ČSL mostly focused on creating and innovating their programme in the 1990s. 
The party’s first attempt at a long-term programme dates back to spring 1990, but the 
dynamics of development inside the party in the early 1990s when KDU-ČSL sought to 
establish a better and modern profile, and especially to clean itself of the label associating it 
with the former National Front. This made the party adopt a strategy combining medium-term 
and electoral programmes, with other types of documents stating its position on various 
issues. In 1995 the document called “Foundations of KDU-ČSL policy” [Východiska politiky 
KDU-ČSL] was adopted and in 1997 another three: “Christian-Democratic politics for the 
twenty-first century” [Křesťanskodemokratická politika pro 21. století], “KDU-ČSL’s foreign 
policy” [Zahraniční politika KDU-ČSL] and “KDU-ČSL’s social doctrine” [Sociální doktrína 
KDU-ČSL], which together we can understand as the party’s long-term programme (Suchý 
1999). KDU-ČSL did not create its own programme material for the 2002 election as it 
was co-operating with the parties of the so-called Quad-Coalition. The party has been 
embroiled in internal disputes since then, however, and programmatic activity has receded 
somewhat. In the last years it has been communicating its position chiefly in electoral 
programmes. 
What VV’s fundamental programmatic document is cannot be established entirely 
clearly. The party produced a large document laconically entitled “Political programme” 
in 2010. By virtue of its structure and contents it could be used either as a fundamental or 
an electoral programme and it was indeed used in the latter capacity in the 2010 election. 
VV does not really offer any other coherent programmatic statements. Strictly speaking, 
TOP09 does not have a fundamental programme, limited as it is to a very brief statement 
of values in the documents “Programme ground and principles” and “Decalogue of 
values.” Apart from this the party only produced two electoral programmes for  the early 
election in 2009, which was called off, and for the regular term election of 2010.
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It is clear from what has been said thus far that as a rule the relevant Czech parties 
produce extensive electoral programmes in the process of identifying their  goals. 
                                                 
6  ODS’s first document was adopted as early as 1995 and it was enhanced and developed (rather than 
substituted) with other documents: “the Poděbrady articles” (Poděbradské artikuly, 1998), “the Blue chance” 
(Modrá šance, 2003–2004), “Together for a better life” [Společně pro lepší život, 2005] and, most recently, the 
Vision 2020.  
7  In ODS the collection of documents entitled “the Blue chance”, elaborated by the party in opposition, 
played the same role.  
8  It is true, however, that TOP09 was only founded in summer 2009 whereas VV constituted itself 
already in 2001 – though until 2009 the party limited itself to Prague local politics.  
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Employing the methods of Comparative Manifesto Project (2010), Otto Eibl’s study of 
the most recent election of the Chamber of Deputies in summer 2010 will help us to 
illustrate our point here. The electoral programmes were fairly detailed in 2010, ranging 
from 268 to 1165 coded units.
9
 Limiting ourselves to the coded units with political 
meanings we can observe that the parties’ programmes confirm the stability of the Czech 
party spectrum laid out along the right-left axis. The programmes of ODS and TOP09 
place the parties on the right and KSČM’s programme anchors the party on the Left. 
KDU-ČSL and VV are centrist, as is the ČSSD which in comparison with the past shifted 
towards the centre. The prevailing issues are those concerning economic and social 
policies, as well as questions concerning the active role played by the state and its 
effectiveness, which again confirms the socio-economic cleavage as the dominant axis of 
Czech parties’ political contestation (Eibl, 2010: 81-86). Also important is the fact that in 
those and other topics the parties propose alternatives to the electorate both in terms of 
setting the political goals and of proposing  ways of achieving those goals.  
The fact that the goals set in party programmes (especially in electoral 
programmes) are transformed into goals of the executive which are traditionally 
announced in government policy statements is of no less importance. The policy statement 
of the present coalition government made up of ODS, TOP09 and VV can serve as an 
example here (Vláda ČR, 2010). The policy areas that the government says need to be 
dealt with as a priority correspond to the priorities articulated in the parties’ electoral 
programmes in 2010 (see ODS 2010, TOP09 2010, VV 2010). Naturally, the statement 
speaks a different language from that employed by the electoral programmes, with their 
appeals; a number of specific points also result from coalition compromises. But on both 
ideological and practical levels it exhibits clear correspondences with the political lines of 
the parties involved. Where the parties’ specific goals complement each other, the 
government’s statement feels as if it consists of goals defined by the coalition partners 
together. For instance, in one section of the statement the struggle against corruption 
emphasised by TOP09 and VV in particular sits next to the project of digitalising the state 
administration, eGovernment proposed by ODS.  
Political parties’ share in defining the political objectives of the government will 
be thrown into an even sharper relief if we compare the policy statement of Pe tr Nečas’s 
government with that of Jan Fischer’s caretaker government, which preceded it (Vláda 
ČR, 2009). The statement of Fischer’s government is both extremely short and non-
specific, limiting itself to declaring a few generic political goals which any government 
would have to address at the time, for instance the completion of the Czech presidency of 
the Council of the European Union, or the endeavour to make a budget with a smaller 
deficit than was the case in previous years.  
 
  
 
Articulation and aggregation of interests 
 
The function which articulates and aggregates interests links parties with the system in 
which collective interests are mediated and therefore with the world of pressure groups. One 
thing must be made clear at the outset: this function is only one of several. If it hypertrophies 
at the expense of other functions, the political party in question tends to become a party of 
                                                 
9  According to the methods of the long-term international survey Comparative Manifesto Project a 
coded unit is a meaningful sentence or part thereof. KSČM’s programme was the shortest, but this party can rely 
on its ideological profile which is stable in the long term and on its extensive fundamental and medium-term 
programmes.  
 1
0 
patronage and to develop clientelist relations with voters and also with interest groups 
attaching to the party (see Müller, 2006). If, however, a party was to give up on articulating 
and aggregating interests, it would end up in the position of the business firm party mentioned 
above with all the potential negative consequences this entails. 
The tradition of Czech partisanship in the inter-war period involved a fairly high 
degree of party patronage. In a context characterised by milieux that were at once strongly  
party-political and social, and where the parties had at their disposal wide networks of 
auxiliary organisations ranging from trade unions to consumer co-operatives, they could 
distribute various material and non-material advantages to the pressure groups attaching to 
them. The party was clearly identified as the benefactor, and enjoyed a fairly substantial 
ability to mobilise and control the political behaviour of its clients. Non-democratic regimes 
lasting several decades disrupted these affiliations, however, and in post-1989 Czech society 
the connections between political parties and pressure groups had to be rebuilt practically 
from scratch, as the process of the country’s triple transition encompassed not only the 
construction of plurality politics but also a fundamental transformation of the economy and of 
the structure of the society. Collective interests were subject to deep transformation, some of 
the structures and actors vanishing and others being born; new means of liaising with political 
parties only gradually appeared. At the same time, the political parties’ traditional financial 
dependence both on mass membership and on a wide network of collateral social and 
economic organisations was not renewed after 1989. The Czech Republic adopted a model in 
which political parties are mostly funded by the state, the importance of which has only 
increased since the second half of the 1990s when, in response to scandals connected with 
party political funding, the system of auditing donations has been tightened up (see Dančák, 
Hloušek, 2007: 197-198; Kopecký, 2006: 139-141). 
Soon it became apparent that the narrow intertwining of professional interests and 
party politics along the First Republic model would not be possible. This argument is 
illustrated clearly by the fate of agrarian parties in the early 1990s (see Hloušek, Kopeček, 
2010: 117). Privatisation, the gradual establishment of social dialogue institutions and further 
changes in society opened up the way to different forms of contact between the parties and 
pressure groups. Both positive and negative aspects of party patronage appeared. Some of the 
latter have been pointed out by Wolfgang Müller (2006: 192-193): a greater social integration 
of certain groups (for instance unionised workers); a tendency to use public funds 
ineffectively to the benefit of the clients; corruption. The perceived degree of party patronage 
in the Czech Republic today is fairly high, and the success of the VV in the 2010 election 
testifies to this fact. Under the banner of banishing the “dinosaurs” from Czech politics, the 
party established, in a somewhat populist manner, the issues of political corruption and 
clientelism as pressing topics. Without attempting to open a normative debate about the 
admissibility of the various types of patronage,
10
 let it be said that a transparent and legal way 
of inter-linking political parties and pressure groups is an important element in the 
representative democracy model, as it connects party politics with the collective interests that 
compete for public support in the Czech pluralistic intermediary system (Krpec, 2009: 101-
102). 
In essence there are two ways in which parties become intertwined with pressure 
groups. Either the pressure groups are collective members of the parties (such a model is 
cultivated by the Austrian political parties, for instance), or the connection is less formal, 
manifesting itself in contacts or in situations where an individual party member is also a 
member of a pressure group. As for the first option, a clear connection appears between the 
                                                 
10  The general hypothesis that parties have turned away from mass patronage towards wooing business 
interests, that they are more involved in pecuniary transfers and thus get closer to what is encompassed by the 
concept of corruption (Müller 2006: 193-194), is also valid for the Czech Republic.  
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length of time a party has been active in Czech politics and the number of organisations 
attaching to it. ČSSD has at its disposal a network of partner organisations: Social-democratic 
women, the Young social democrats, Zvonečník (an environmental organisation), the Union 
of workers’ sports clubs, the ČSSD Club of senior citizens and the Christian-democratic 
platform which fulfils the function of affiliating believers to the party. The Masaryk Academy 
plays the specific role of a social-democratic think-tank. What these organisations have in 
common is that they are open both to members and non-members of the party and thus fulfil 
the function of “prospectors” for the party. At the same time it must be said that their role in 
party politics or hierarchy is minor, as is true of other formations. KDU-ČSL’s network of 
partner institutions is similarly extensive. In addition to the Young Christian Democrats and 
KDU-ČSL Women’s Association, it encompasses the affiliated think-tanks, the Institute of 
Political and Economic Studies and the European Academy for Democracy. A marginal 
Christian Trade Union Coalition is linked with KDU-ČSL, an interesting but ultimately failed 
attempt to resuscitate the long tradition of confessionally-grounded trade unions. KSČM also 
has auxiliary organisations which associate women and youth with communist leanings,
11
 but 
the attempt in the 1990s to establish a communist trade union movement was not successful, 
failing to attract mass membership. The existence within the party structure of certain 
professionally-oriented “clubs” (of international politics, sociology and economy) is also 
worth noting (see Fiala et al., 2005: 1419-1421). 
ODS co-operates with the youth association Young Conservatives and two think-
tanks, CEVRO and eStat. The Green party, TOP09 and VV do not have any partner 
organisations, however TOP09 and VV in particular put their bets on modern approaches to 
attracting individuals who are interested in the party’s politics but do not wish to become 
members. On their special web pages TOP09 presently registers over 8,000 “supporters”, and 
with VV the number is a much higher 18,000; in the latter case the supporters, if registered, 
can partake in intra-party referenda.  
Clearly the parties which tend to create these auxiliary supporting structures are either 
those which have a historical tradition which goes back deep into the era of mass parties (such 
as the Social and Christian Democrats), or, to a lesser degree, those which have been newly 
created since 1989 but nevertheless have since established complex organisational structures 
and have a history of their own (see van Biezen, 2003: 146-150).
12
 New parties with an 
insufficiently large and stable membership attempt to enlarge their circle of supporters by 
employing new communication technologies, thus seeking to reduce the burden of acquiring 
adherents traditionally, through institutionalised membership. Only time will tell, however, 
whether such an on-line association can replace the traditional institutional structures 
inherited from the era of mass parties.  
The question as to whether or not the Czech political parties nurture contacts–formal 
or informal–with the important pressure groups is of no lesser importance for the function of 
articulating and aggregating interests. Such informal contacts definitely do exist, the 
connection between the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions and ČSSD being 
perhaps the most prominent example. Although by no means a case of the party controlling 
the unions, the degree of personal interconnection between trade union bosses and the ČSSD, 
for instance, is significant: presidents of the trade unions have stood on ČSSD’s candidate 
lists in various past elections. Similar personal links exist between the Green party on the one 
side and the environmental organisations and movements on the other. KDU-ČSL, for its part, 
                                                 
11  The best known communist youth organisation is the Communist Youth Union [Komunistický svaz 
mládeže], which however due to its radicalness distanced itself from KSČM’ official policy and is today 
independent of the party.  
12  The nuclei of ČSSD appeared in 1878, the first catholic party in the Czech lands was founded in 1896 
and ČSL was established gradually between 1919 and 1922. KSČ split off the Social Democrats already in 1921.  
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is traditionally close to the institutions of the Catholic Church. ODS and lately also TOP09 
have been nurturing privileged contacts with the business sphere.  
But it is precisely on the example of ODA’s links to business interests that one can 
criticise the problematic by-products, actual or only potential, of the Czech parties’ efforts to 
aggregate affiliated interests. A number of media and political critics of ODS talk about the 
so-called “Godfathers,” pointing out the unclear connections between individual business 
interests and ODS politicians, links that are kept hidden from the public eye. The annual 
financial reports which the parties must release each spring testify in their own way to these 
connections: in 2010, ODS received donations amounting to 233 million CZK, whereas 
ČSSD received only 67 million, TOP09 about 39 million, VV less than 23 million and KSČM 
about 5.5 million. 
The close connection between the VV leadership and Vít Bárta’s security company 
ABL is even more cautionary, Bárta being the party’s founder.13 In this case it appears that 
the economic interests of a private company and the political interests of the party have 
melted into one which certainly does not testify to the quality of the democratic process.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mobilisation and socialisation function 
 
As already stated above, the function enabling political parties to mobilise and 
socialise their electorate manifests itself particularly at the point of election (in voter turnout) 
and in the parties’ ability to attract membership. Figure 1 gives an overview of voter turnout 
in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2010, including both chambers of the parliament, as 
well as data pertaining to the elections of the European parliament and of the regional and 
local assemblies. Two facts apparent from this data deserve particular attention. First, the 
turnout was demonstrably higher in the first years after November 1989, both in the elections 
of the Chamber of Deputies and in the local elections.
14
 This can be attributed to the initial 
enthusiasm and generally higher willingness to participate in the political process following 
the fall of communism, although such an explanation obviously does not lend itself easily to  
empirical verification.  
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of voter turnout (expressed in per cent) in the Czech Republic, 1990–2010 
                                                 
13  Although Bárta formally relinquished his share in ABL after entering “big politics” many of VV’s top 
brass worked in ABL and this includes individuals who occupied positions of ministers.  
14  Data on the election of local assemblies in 1990 is unavailable.  
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Data source: www.volby.cz 
 
Voter turnout decreased in the second half of the 1990s, but – and this is of extraordinary 
importance – it also stabilised at that time. The second important observation, and here the 
Czech Republic does not differ substantially from other European democracies, is that the 
turnout is significantly lower in the so-called second-order elections (see for instance Reif, 
Schmitt, 1980). Here again the turnout is stable, with largest fluctuations in the Senate 
elections).
15
 It does not therefore seem that the parties would fail their mobilisation 
function; indeed, the example of the 2008 regional election, which was preceded by very 
intensive campaigning (see Eibl et al., 2008), testifies to the contrary: the parties have been 
able to induce the electorate to participate in the electoral process.  
The topic of party membership is often discussed in connection with the parties’ 
political socialisation function. Generally speaking, the importance of party membership in 
the functioning and especially in the funding of parties decreases (this fact was already 
reflected upon by Katz and Mair, but also by Panebianco, in connection with the definition of 
a new developmental type of “post-mass” political parties). Like other countries of the former 
Eastern bloc, the Czech Republic also has a specific experience of the institution of party 
membership (as well as membership in other organisations affiliated to the Party) in 
comparison with the countries of the Western Europe. Before 1989 party membership was to 
a certain extent a prerequisite for career development and has had negative connotations ever 
since. The data indicating membership of the four political parties which have been relevant 
in the long term (see Table 1) is therefore influenced by two issues.  
  
Table 1: Czech political party membership
16
 
  ČSSD KSČM ODS KDU-ČSL 
                                                 
15  The Senate is elected by an absolute majority two-round system. The turnout in the second round is 
usually lower than in the first but this is to a significant degree caused by the fact that as a rule another election 
(local or regional) is held concurrently with the first round of the Senate election.  
16  Data given on ČSSD membership from early 1990s in particular is probably overestimated due to the 
existence of the so-called “dead souls” through which some local organisations sought to increase their influence 
within the party. Similar situation occurred in ODS and again in ČSSD in the 2000s.  
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1991 * 354 500 18 600 94 100 
1992 11 900 317 100 23 300 88 800 
1993 10 900 212 700 22 000 80 000 
1994 10 500 196 200 23 000 74 000 
1995 11 400 171 300 * * 
1996 13 000 154 900 22 900 * 
1997 14 100 142 500 22 100 62500 
1998 17 300 136 500 19 300 60 500 
1999 18 700 128 300 18 400 56 600 
2000 17 000 120 700 18 900 55 300 
2001 16 200 113 000 * 51 500 
2002 16 000 107 800 20 400 50 700 
2003 16 600 100 800 21 600 49 400 
2004 16 300 94 500 23 100 46 900 
2005 16 700 88 000 26 200 44 300 
2006 17 600 82 900 * * 
2007 * 77 100 29 900 * 
2008 20 700 * * * 
2009 23 000 66 600 33 000 36 000 
2010 24 100 * 31 500 34 300 
Source: Data provided by Lubomír Kopeček, based on information provided by political 
parties. 
 
The first issue concerns political parties which were in the past constituents of the National 
Front, i.e. KSČM and KDU-ČSL. These parties entered post-November 1989 democratic 
politics “equipped” with abundant memberships and in comparison with the other parties still 
exhibit above-average membership today. Following a sudden drop in membership in the first 
month following November 1989, gradual yet substantial decrease in membership of both 
parties is apparent, which is connected with, among other things, the high average age of the 
party members.  
The second important issue concerns the fact that the majority of the political parties 
were built up from scratch after 1989 and this included membership. After an initial surge 
membership stagnated or stabilised. Generally speaking, membership of Czech parties is 
relatively low and with the exceptions of KSČM and KDU-ČSL (in the latter case until the 
mid-1990s), Czech parties can be defined as voter-oriented parties (as opposed to member-
oriented parties). On the other hand, Czech parties are open in terms of the demands they 
place on new members (Linek, Pecháček, 2005). The function of political socialisation which 
is connected with the attempts to enlarge membership has been put somewhat into question in 
the Czech Republic, both in the 1990s and recently, by the scandals of the so-called “dead 
souls”, affecting mainly ČSSD and ODS. Before party congresses in particular, certain 
regions reported substantial, yet purely calculated increases in membership (the position of 
local and regional party organisations on country-wide party congresses is as a rule a function 
of the membership of these organisations). In evaluating the parties’ ability to draw new 
members one has to bear in mind the contemporary method of party funding; in accordance 
with the concept of cartel parties, the established parties rely mostly on state funding 
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(awarded for votes polled and seats won, but also for general functioning of the parties) and 
donations, not on regular contributions by individual members (see Rybářová, 2006: 57-99). 
In this sense the parties’ motivation to obtain (and socialise) new members is weakened.  
 
 
Recruiting political personnel  
 
As indicated above, the institutions playing the key role in recruiting political 
personnel in the Czech political system are the bicameral parliament and the government. As 
for the former, where the Chamber of Deputies constitutes the more important chamber, the 
key role of political parties is to a certain degree predetermined by the Constitution and the 
electoral law which defines the list proportional system used. Electoral law (Act of Law no. 
247/1995, Coll., as amended) stipulates that “[a]ny registered political party and movement 
whose activities have not been suspended, including any coalition thereof, may present a 
candidate list for the elections to the Chamber of Deputies.”17 To be sure, this does not 
entirely exclude with no political affiliation from standing for election, but their participation 
is de facto in the hands of the party apparatuses. Elections of the Chamber of Deputies are 
therefore contests of parties’ candidate lists. Election results (see Table 2) show that the 
overwhelming majority of both deputies and candidates nominated by parties represented in 
the Chamber of Deputies are themselves members of these parties. 
  
 
Table 2: Share of deputies and candidates nominated by political parties represented in the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament who declared “no political affiliation” (1996-
2010) expressed in per cent. 
    1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 
ČSSD Deputies 0 0 0 4.05 3.57 
  Candidates 0 0 0.29 2.05 1.18 
KDU-ČSL Deputies 0 5 6.45* 0 - 
  Candidates 6.71 6.71 4.97* 6.71 - 
KSČM Deputies 0 0 7.32 3.85 15.38 
  Candidates 2.01 2.68 9.94 10.79 14.04 
ODA Deputies 0 - - - - 
  Candidates 2.35 - - - - 
ODS Deputies 0 0 0 0 0 
  Candidates 0 0 0 0 0.29 
SPR-RSČ Deputies 0 - - - - 
  Candidates 0 - - - - 
SZ Deputies - - - 16.67 - 
  Candidates - - - 32.65 - 
TOP09 Deputies - - - - 26.83 
  Candidates - - - - 42.69 
US Deputies - 5.26 -* - - 
  Candidates - 1.35 -* - - 
VV Deputies - - - - 12.5 
                                                 
17 English translation taken from http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/1995/247.html, accessed on 12 July 
2011. 
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  Candidates - - - - 19.29 
Source: www.volby.cz 
* KDU-ČSL and US-DEU on the candidate list of Coalition. 
 
The generally high level of party membership of the candidates and deputies testifies 
to the fact that in terms of occupying seats in the Chamber of Deputies the political parties 
fulfil their function of recruiting political personel. It has, however, demonstrably weakened 
at certain points. The first concerns the onset of new parties. A higher share of non-partisan 
candidates and deputies was observable in the case of the Green Party in 2006, and again with 
the two new successful parties in 2010, a fact that can be explained by the comparative 
underdevelopment of their membership at the time of the election.
18
 The second point 
concerns KSČM where an incremental increase of non-partisan candidates (and to a certain 
extent also of deputies) is apparent. The explanation can be sought in the party’s decreasing 
membership and the structural transformation of this membership. Despite these comments, 
however, it is apparent that the political parties play a key role in occupying the seats in the 
more important of the parliament’s chambers.  
 
 
Table 3: Overview of the share (expressed in per cent) of candidates and deputies with no 
political affiliation (1996-2010) 
  1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Candidates without political affiliation 15.25 11.26 41.69 39.54 35.8 
Deputies without political affiliation 0 1 2.5 2.5 10 
Source: www.volby.cz 
 
The overview provided in Table 3 indicates that the total number of candidates 
without political affiliation has increased historically, but this has to be put in the context of 
the significant increase in the total number of candidates over the period in question. Whereas 
in 1996 and 1998, four and half thousand, and three and half thousand candidates, 
respectively, contested the seats, in subsequent years it has always been more than five 
thousand candidates. In addition, ten more parties on average
19
 have been contesting the 
election since 2002 than was the case in 1996 and 1998. The bulk of those are marginal, 
without a developed structure of local organisations and with a very limited membership. This 
is one of the reasons which make the second indication in Table 3 concerning deputies 
actually elected interesting. With the exception of 2010, the share of deputies with no political 
affiliation has been minimal. As already indicated above, this finding should not come as a 
surprise, given the way the electoral system is set up and bearing in mind the expected 
“overheads” incurred by the political parties in offering seats on their candidate lists.   
With the Senate (which is the upper chamber) the situation is somewhat different. 
Here electoral law allows independent candidates to stand; in other words, Senate candidates 
do not need to be nominated by a political party. In the discussions preceding the creation of 
the Senate and concerning its purpose, as well as the electoral system it should employ, the 
Senate was understood not only as a counterweight to the Chamber of Deputies in the law-
                                                 
18  The case of the Green party is interesting here: in 2006, more than one third of its candidates professed 
no political affiliation. By 2010, the number was down to slightly more than 15 per cent. In studying newly 
successful political parties one can envisage a certain “magnetic” effect by means of which the party attracts new 
members out of which she can choose its candidates. 
19  One of the reasons for the expansion of electoral parties was the 1999 change in party funding 
subsequent to a ruling of the Constitutional Court. This lowered the threshold in votes polled which the parties 
have to cross in order to attract the contribution of the state towards electoral expenses (see Rybářová 2006). 
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making process, but also as an electoral arena in which the personal dimension of politics 
would be made more manifest.
20
 The set-up created by the electoral legislation allows us to 
work with a different type of data than was the case with the Chamber of Deputies. In 
addition to the candidates “with no political affiliation” we can equally propose the category 
of independent candidates (candidates not nominated by a political party). 
 
 
Table 4: Overview of shares of independent and non-affiliated Senate candidates and senators 
(1996-2010)*
21
 
  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Candidates without political 
affiliation 23.94 22.63 32.5 35.71 39.09 34.8 41.5 31.72 
Senators without political 
affiliation 12.35 14.81 29.63 37.04 14.81 22.22 25.93 18.52 
Independent candidates 8.63 8.03 13.75 6.55 4.06 3.43 2 1.76 
Independent senators 1.23 0 3.7 3.7 0 3.7 0 0 
 Source: www.volby.cz 
* In every case the data concerns the election result (i.e. the newly-elected senators) and not 
the overall constitution of the Senate at the time. 
 
In comparison with the Chamber of Deputies, the data in Table 4 indicates a higher 
share of candidates and Senators without political affiliation. The question is, however, how 
this data ought to be interpreted. To a certain degree, the electoral system plays into the hands 
of strong personalities (often of local or regional renown) to the detriment of those who are 
seen as “grey” party candidates. Political parties are thus more motivated to woo non-partisan 
strong personalities: as the data on independent candidates/senators show, most of those who 
are “non-partisan” are supported by a political party. The share of truly independent 
candidates and senators is again minimal.  
The last organ of the state which we will analyse is the government. As already stated, 
the cabinet is the most important organ of the executive in the Czech parliamentary system, 
shaping the policies; it is therefore very important for evaluating the function of political 
personnel recruitment. Bearing in mind the election results described above, the set-up of the 
political system favours a strong role played by the political parties. The government is 
accountable to the Chamber of Deputies and this chamber’s confidence is a prerequisite for 
the government’s existence. Although the individual members of the government are 
nominated by the head of state, (s)he must do so with respect to the balance of power in the 
Chamber of Deputies. This fact is embedded in practice, where the nomination proper is 
preceded by informal negotiations between the president and representatives of successful 
political parties; the role of the head of state is rather one of a moderator. (But depending on 
the specific situation the position of the president can be much stronger in this respect. For 
more detail on how the Czech governments have been constituted see Havlík, 2011). In the 
Czech Republic’s history thus far there have been thirteen governments (plus two federal 
cabinets), an overview of which is given in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Overview of governments in the Czech Republic and in Czechoslovakia (1990-2012) 
Prime minister Government formed Parties involved 
                                                 
20  The Senate is voted in 81 single-member constituencies by a two round system where an absolute 
majority is required. A third of the chamber is elected every two years.  
21  The table does not include by-elections held if a senator’s seat becomes vacant. 
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Čalfa 27 June 1990 OF, HZDS, KDH 
Stráský 2 July 1992 ODS, HZDS, KDU-ČSL 
Pithart 29 June 1990 OF, KDU-ČSL, (HSD-SMS) 
Klaus I 2 July 1992 ODS(-KDS), KDU-ČSL, ODA 
Klaus II 2 July 1996 ODS, KDU-ČSL, ODA 
Tošovský 2 January 1998 KDU-ČSL, US, ODA 
Zeman 23 July 1998 ČSSD 
Špidla 12 July 2002 ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU 
Gross 4 August 2004 ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU 
Paroubek 25 April 2005 ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU 
Topolánek I. 4 September 2006 ODS 
Topolánek II. 9 January 2007 ODS, KDU-ČSL, SZ, 
Fischer 8 May 2009 ČSSD, ODS, (SZ) 
Nečas I. 13 July 2010 ODS, TOP 09, VV  
Nečas II. 27 April 2012 ODS, TOP 09, Lidem 
Sources: authors using data on www.vlada.cz 
 
The overview indicates that coalitions have been dominant during the whole period. 
Only two governments, both minority, were single-party, out of which one (Topolánek I.) was 
not granted the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies. Although stable coalition patterns 
cannot be identified entirely clearly, coalition governance in the Czech Republic can be 
characterised by some of its traits. One is that radical political parties (KSČM and SPR-RSČ) 
are absent from the governments. Another is that one of the large parties (ČSSD and ODS) is 
often present. 
In evaluating the parties’ elite recruitment function, an important consideration is the 
occupancy of seats in government, and it can be said that the practice hitherto has been to 
occupy the positions of ministers with party politicians. The two caretaker governments are 
very interesting in this respect. The first, Josef Tošovský’s cabinet, was formed in response to 
the government crisis in late 1997, and then-president Václav Havel played an important role 
in its constitution. The specific situation of the turn of 1997 and 1998 allowed Havel to have a 
more substantial say in the cabinet’s composition. Given that the cabinet was only temporary, 
and that it needed to secure the Chamber of Deputies’ confidence, the elite recruitment 
function was not substantially weakened; indeed, the political parties participated in that 
government’s formation. The situation in 2009–2010, when Jan Fischer’s government was in 
office subsequent to the fall of Mirek Topolánek’s second cabinet, was somewhat different. 
The solution to the governmental crisis at the time, and to the impossibility de facto of 
constituting a programmatically homogeneous cabinet, initially copied the situation in 
1997/1998, even in its temporariness. Yet the intervention of the Constitutional Court and 
subsequent events precluded the calling of an early election and prolonged the term of 
Fischer’s “temporary” cabinet to fourteen months. Various opinions can be proposed 
concerning the Fischer government, which was in fact created on the basis of an agreement 
arrived at by the two large parties, but without those parties’ representatives (see Havlík, 
2011, Hloušek, Kopeček 2011). Given the lack of an ideologically coherent majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies at the time, the political parties’ function of elite recruitment was 
weakened, without however the parties being wholly excluded from the process of forming 
both caretaker governments.  
The governments that appeared following the first fully free election in 1990 are also 
interesting in the context of “non-political” cabinets. The specific atmosphere of the period, in 
which a sceptical view of partisanship was one of the defining features, influenced the 
personal make-up of both federal and national governments. In analysing these two 
 1
9 
governments Lubomír Kopeček goes so far as to use the term “semi-political” cabinets 
(Kopeček, 2010: 79–82). Notwithstanding how necessary it is to take into account the 
peculiarities of the period, the goal of constituting a government encompassing as many 
ideological currents as possible (with the understandable exception of the communists) was at 
least as important as efforts to make it a government of “experts” or “non-partisans.” By 
virtue of their nature and their process of inception, however, these two cabinets differ 
significantly from Tošovský’s and Fischer’s governments. For the latter two the “semi-
political” (or even non-political or caretaker) nature was the decisive factor.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As we can see, the extent to which Czech political parties fulfil their basic functions 
varies. In none of the four key areas can we observe the parties not fulfilling their function at 
all, but in some areas they are not very successful, or their goals are attained by problematic 
procedures. 
An example of an area in which the parties are not very successful is the mobilisation 
of citizens into political participation. This is not so much the case with elections, as the 
parties’ efforts to mobilise voters to turn up at first-order elections do not lag behind the 
European average, but more intensive forms of political participation, especially party 
membership, are definitely affected. Here Czech political parties appear to follow the cartel-
type party, giving up on enlarging their mass membership or even keeping it at the existing 
level. Connected with this is the fact that the relevant Czech parties are not financially 
dependent on  membership fees; their primary source of funding is the state (contributions for 
votes, seats, and for general functioning) and sponsor donations (KSČM is partially exempt 
from this pattern). 
Articulation and aggregation of interests is an area where the function is fulfilled by 
problematic procedures. Czech political parties exhibit a fairly high degree of communication 
with organised and private interests. The potential for aggregating and articulating interests is 
certainly there, but in many cases is not exploited. Here we face a substantial deficiency in 
Czech political culture, namely the tendency to substitute particular individual, private or 
business interests for legitimate group interests. In a way, the pressure groups themselves are 
partly to blame here. As Martin Myant (2000) has shown with reference to employers’ 
associations and business pressure groups, these organisations have not always been 
interested in co-operating closely with particular political parties, but as early as the 1990s 
focused on dialogue between the government and the trade unions in bilateral and tripartite 
negotiations.  
Identifying political goals and recruiting political personnel are perhaps the two 
functions best fulfilled by the parties. As for the former, how those goals are realised in actual 
government policies is a question we had best leave aside here; the efficiency of the latter is 
illustrated by the analysis of Czech cabinet-forming practices presented above. In this respect 
the parties’ role was weakened only by the caretaker cabinets, which themselves were a 
temporary solution to crises arising from a certain immobility in the party system, rather than 
from an unwillingness on the part of parties to participate in government formation. And the 
examples of caretaker governments clearly show that parties seek to preserve a substantial 
amount of control, however indirect, over the final shape of such cabinets. 
Our general conclusion, perhaps controversial, is that Czech political parties do solidly 
fulfil a range of standard functions. They also have at their disposal tools to fulfil other 
functions which they have chosen not to, or find themselves unable to, perform more 
adequately. A hypothesis which suggests itself is that one of the main causes of the 
 2
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problematic performance of Czech political parties in certain areas, as well as of their 
negative rating by the Czech public, is the low degree of political culture manifested by the 
party leaders. But that would have to be the subject of another, separate study.  
 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
ČSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party 
HSD-SMS – Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia 
KDS – Christian Democratic Party 
KDU-ČSL – Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party 
KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
Lidem – Liberal Democrats 
ODA – Civic Democratic Alliance 
ODS – Civic Democratic Party 
OF – Civic Forum 
OH – Civic Movement 
SZ – Green Party 
TOP09 – Tradition, Responsibility, and Prosperity 
VV – Public Affairs 
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